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NOTES
MURDER IN THE ABSTRACT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE MISAPPROPRIATION OF BRANDENBURG
When Paladin Enterprises published Hit Man, a manual about murder
for hire, it knew and intended that the book would be used for such a pur-
pose. When James Perry used the information contained in Hit Man to mur-
der three innocent persons, he started a legal debate about the scope of
First Amendment protections for books that instruct how to commit criminal
acts. Many scholars and commentators indicated that Brandenburg v. Ohio
contains the applicable constitutional standard; however, in litigation
against Paladin, the survivors of the decedents challenged the conventional
wisdom.
This Note examines the Brandenburg test for its applicability to pub-
lished materials that function as instruction manuals to perpetrate crimes.
Because Brandenburg is inextricably linked with the crowd context, it is
inapplicable to the published materials that function not as advocacy, but as
instruction. Because Hit Man was used exactly as Paladin had intended,
Paladin should be held liable in tort for the wrongful deaths of Perry's
three victims.
INTRODUCTION
With the filing of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises' in 1996, publisher liabil-
ity for criminal acts committed by third parties as a result of publications
has become the focus of intense legal debate. At the center of that debate is
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech 2-- and the rights thus
bestowed upon publishers through the traditional and long-standing interpre-
tation of that Amendment, an interpretation founded in the heritage and
development of the clear-and-present danger inquiry as refined by
Brandenburg v. Ohio.' In the developing and voluminous commentary by
940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 2548 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1998).
2 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 395 U.S. 444 (1969). "[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting imminent lawless action
566 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 6:2
legal scholars and commentators alike, evaluation of the speech contained in
the books at issue in Rice has appeared to proceed on a presumption that the
Brandenburg test is the appropriate rubric. The analysis, however, may
actually be hindered by such an approach. This Note explores various re-
lated questions regarding whether a legal test originally developed to re-
spond to conduct inextricably tied to the crowd context and to efforts to
steel a group to violent action can be properly applied to language contained
in an instructional manual that teaches the "art" of conducting oneself as a
professional hit man.
Believed to be the first case of its kind,4 Rice focuses on the issue of
whether the publishers of an instructional manual on how to commit murder
for hire may be held liable in tort to the families of the three victims killed
by a professional hit man who followed the manual's instructions to perpe-
trate the murders.5
and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes believed that "under the rigorous clear-and-present
danger test society must tolerate even speech that we 'loathe' and believe 'fraught with
death,' unless an immediate check is required to prevent imminent danger." RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 116 (1992) (quoting Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
4 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit called the case "unique in the law."
Rice, 128 F.3d at 267.
' On or about January 24, 1992, James E. Perry, a self-proclaimed street preacher
in Detroit, responded to defendant Paladin Enterprises's catalogue advertisement of a
book by author Rex Feral (a pseudonym for "King of the Wild Animals"), entitled Hit
Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, and a book by J. Flores, enti-
tled How to Make a Disposable Silencer, Volume II: A Complete Illustrated Guide. See
Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. Prior to March 3, 1992, Lawrence Horn hired Perry to mur-
der his ex-wife Mildred Horn, their eight-year-old quadriplegic son Trevor, and
Trevor's private-duty nurse, Janice Saunders. See id. at 839. Horn stood to inherit $1.7
million in damages awarded in a medical malpractice judgment entered for Trevor
Horn, who was left a quadriplegic as the result of a hospital accident some years be-
fore. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Closing Argument: Let 'Hit Man' Take a Tort Hit, TEX.
LAW., Aug. 19, 1996, at 22, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXLAWR File. Law-
rence Horn was a down-and-out former Motown music technician living in Los Angel-
es. See David Montgomery, Murder Manual Lawsuit Tests First Amendment, WASH.
POST, July 22, 1996, at B1.
On March 3, 1993, James Perry traveled from Detroit to Montgomery County,
Maryland, where he murdered Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders, in the
Horn residence. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 839. At his trial, Perry testified that when he
committed the murders he followed instructions appearing in Hit Man and Silencers in
planning, executing, and attempting to get away with the murders. See id. Among the
instructions Perry was found to have followed was a passage in which the author wrote:
You will need to know beyond any doubt that the desired result has been
achieved.... You will not want to be at point blank range to avoid having the
victim's blood splatter you or your clothing. At least three shots should be fired
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I. THE PLAINTIFFS' SUIT AND THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Brought by the survivors of the three decedents, Rice is a civil action
against the defendant publisher Paladin Enterprises for aiding and abetting
murder.6 The plaintiffs additionally seek damages in survival and wrongful
death actions based on civil conspiracy, strict liability, and negligence.7
In April 1996, defendant Paladin moved for summary judgment,' claim-
ing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on First Amendment
protection for Hit Man and Silencers under the United States Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of speech.9 To be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, a party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate that no issue of
material fact exists.1 Solely for the purposes of the motion, therefore, the
defendant made several factual concessions.
Paladin conceded that in publishing, marketing, and advertising Hit Man
and Silencers, it "intended and had knowledge that thei; [sic] publications
would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to plan
and execute the crime of murder for hire, in the manner set forth in the
publications."" Paladin also agreed that "in publishing, distributing and
to insure quick and sure death . aim for the head-preferably the eye sockets if
you are a sharpshooter.
Id. (quoting REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTORS 24 (1983)).
Horn was convicted in Montgomery County Circuit Court in Maryland and sen-
tenced to life without the possibility of parole for hiring Perry. See id. at 838 n.1. Perry
was convicted and sentenced to death for the murders. See Perry v. State, 686 A.2d 274
(Md. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1318 (1997).
6 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838.
7 See id.
Judge Alexander Williams of the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, Southern Division, granted summary judgment in an Amended Memorandum
Opinion and an Amended Order dated September 6, 1996. See id. at 838, 849.
9 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
599 n.2 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring).
10 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
1' Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840. At least two commentators have suggested the reason
for such a concession. Patrick Brogan asserted:
It is not such a foolish admission as it appears. If there had been a dispute over
the facts, the case might have gone immediately to a jury which would have read
the book and might have been less persuaded than constitutional scholars of the
absolute inviolability of the First Amendment.
Patrick Brogan, Free Speech Covers Guides to Murder, US Publishers Argue, HERALD
(Glasgow), July 24, 1996, at 13, available in LEXIS, News Library, GHERLD File.
David Montgomery explained:
That concession is breathtaking and possibly damaging to Paladin, outside legal
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selling Hit Man and Silencers to Perry, they [sic] assisted him in the subse-
quent perpetration of the murders which are the subject of this litigation."' 2
Finally, Paladin did not dispute that Perry followed numerous, detailed in-
structions on "planning, executing and attempting to get away with the mur-
ders."1
3
A. Parties' Stipulations for Purposes of Summary Judgment
All parties to the suit agreed that Paladin and its president, Peder Lund,
"had no specific knowledge that either Perry or Horn planned to commit a
crime; that Perry and Horn had entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of
committing a crime; nor that Perry had been retained by Horn to murder
Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, or Janice Saunders."' 4 In addition, defendant
Paladin asserted that its marketing strategy was intended
to maximize sales to the public, including authors who desire
information for the purpose of writing books about crime
and criminals, law enforcement officers and agencies who
desire information concerning the means and methods of
committing crimes, persons who enjoy reading accounts of
crimes and the means of committing them for purposes of
entertainment, persons who fantasize about committing
crimes but do not thereafter commit them, and criminologists
and others who study criminal methods and mentality. 5
specialists said. [Floyd] Abrams gasped when he heard the wording ... and said
the issues in the case are so extreme that "it sounds like a law school exam that
the professor gives his or her students to test the boundaries of the First Amend-
ment."
Paladin's attorneys assumed the worst set of facts imaginable for today's
hearing so that the other side could not argue that facts were in dispute that a jury
must decide. It's part of their strategy to kill the lawsuit before it reaches a jury.
If [Judge] Williams does order a trial, then Paladin's stipulation will be voided,
and the two sides will argue over the true intent of "Hit Man."
Montgomery, supra note 5, at B1.
2 Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 839.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 840; see also Montgomery, supra note 5, at B1 ("Paladin's attorneys offer
contradictory interpretations of the book. On the one hand, they contend that it is obvi-
ously tongue-in-cheek satire not meant to be taken seriously. But they also say it pro-
vides useful information to crime writers, criminologists and others with legitimate
purposes.").
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Though the plaintiffs "stipulated that selling books to these users was part
of [Paladin's] marketing strategy, ' 6 they did not stipulate that Paladin ac-
tually marketed Hit Man and Silencers to these "general users."' 7
II. HIT MAN: A FACIAL DESCRIPTION
The back cover of Hit Man reads:
Rex Feral kills for hire. Daring. Unafraid. Professional. Now
he dares to tell his professional secrets.
Feral is a hit man. Some consider him a criminal. Others
think him a hero. In truth, he is a lethal weapon aimed at the
enemy of the one who pays him. He is the last recourse in
these times when laws are so twisted that justice goes un-
served. He is a man who controls his destiny through his
private code of ethics, who feels no twinge of guilt at doing
his job. He is a professional killer.
Learn how a pro makes a living at this craft without landing
behind bars. Find out how he gets hit assignments, creates a
false working identity, makes a disposable silencer, leaves
the scene without a trace of evidence, watches his mark
unobserved, and more. An expert assassin and bodyguard,
Feral reveals the details of how to get in, do the job, and get
out-without getting caught. For informational purposes
only!
A Paladin Press Book.1
8
Below this description on the back cover is an artist's depiction of a bottle
of poison, gloves, handcuffs, a serrated hunting knife, and a pistol with a
silencer attached.19
Along with the title and the author's pseudonym Rex Feral,2' the front
cover of Hit Man shows an artist's depiction of a character reminiscent of
16 Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Paladin Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion for Summa-
ry Judgment at 35, Rice (AW-95-3811) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition] (emphasis
added).
" Id. at 35 n.19.
18 REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
back cover (1983).
'9 See id.
20 Paladin has disclosed that the author of the book is actually a woman, but has not
disclosed her identity. See Brogan, supra note 11, at 13.
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Dick Tracy superimposed on a chalk outline of an apparent murder vic-
tim.,,
The page preceding the table of contents displays the following:
WARNING
IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO manufacture a silencer with-
out an appropriate license from the federal government.
There are state and local laws prohibiting the possession of
weapons and their accessories in many areas. Severe penal-
ties are prescribed for violations of these laws. Neither the
author nor the publisher assumes responsibility for the use or
misuse of information contained in this book. For informa-
tional purposes only!22
The inside front cover contains fine print documentation of copyright and
ordering information, reservation of rights to the publisher, and the follow-
ing disclaimer: "Neither the author nor the publisher assumes any responsi-
bility for the use or misuse of information contained in this book."23 The
facing page presents the book's dedication, which reads: "To Those Who
Think,/To Those Who Dare,/To Those Who Do,/To Those Who Suc-
ceed./Success is nothing more than taking advantage of an opportuni-
ty./Anonymous."24
In the preface to Hit Man, the author describes "his" disdain for men
who dream of killing, but who cannot actually bring themselves to commit
such an act.25 In addition, Feral outlines what the reader should gain from
the book and admonishes the reader regarding the requisite care with which
the book should be read.26 The book contains detailed, meticulous instruc-
21 See FERAL, supra note 18, at front cover.
I d. at page facing Table of Contents.
I ld. at inside front cover.
24 Id. at second unnumbered page.
5 See id., at ix-x.
26
A WOMAN RECENTLY ASKED HOW I could, in good conscience, write an in-
struction book on murder.
"How can you live with yourself if someone uses what you write to go out
and take a human life?" she whined.
I am afraid she was quite offended by my answer.
It is my opinion that the professional hit man fills a need in society and is, at
times, the only alternative for "personal" justice. Moreover, if my advice and the
proven methods in this book are followed, certainly no one will ever know.
There are many, many instances when atrocities are committed that the law
will not or cannot pursue. And other times when the law does its part but the
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tions regarding every aspect involved in the perpetration of a murder for
hire. The book sets out charts, diagrams, checklists, photographs, and engi-
neering specifications.' It discusses, among other things, soliciting the ap-
propriate clientele,' obtaining the recommended rifle and weaponry,29
drilling out the weapon's serial number,3" constructing a disposable silencer
for the rifle,3 and using a rat-tail file to alter the gun barrel in order to foil
ballistics tests following the commission of the crime.32 Instructions are
presented in a straightforward, matter-of-fact fashion.
American legal system is so poor that real justice is not served. In those cases, as
in cases of personal revenge and retribution, a man must step outside the law and
take matters into his own hands.
Since most men are capable of carrying out their threats and wishes only in
their heads, it becomes necessary for a man of action to step in and do what is
required: a special man for whom life holds no real meaning and death holds no
fear ... a man who faces death as a challenge and feels the victory each time he
walks away the winner.
It seems that almost every man harbors a fantasy of living the life of Mack
Bolan or some other fictional hero who kills for fun and profit. They dream ...
[b]ut few have the courage or knowledge to make that dream a reality.
You might be like my friends-interested but unsure, standing on the side-
lines afraid to play the game because you don't know the rules. Within the pages
of this book you will learn one of the most successful methods of operation used
by an independent contractor. You will follow the procedures of a man who
works alone, without backing organized crime or on a personal vendetta. Step by
step you will be taken from research to equipment selection to job preparation to
successful job completion. You will learn where to find employment, how much
to charge, and what you can, and cinnot, do with the money you earn.
But deny your urge to skip about, looking for the "good" parts. Start where
any amateur who is serious about turning professional will start-at the begin-
ning.
Id. at ix-xi.
27 See id. at 21-22 (presenting a checklist of weapons, ammunitions, and accesso-
ries), 31 (providing a template for lock picks), 42-50 (displaying step-by-step instruc-
tions on the assembly of a homemade disposable silencer, including 19 photographs),
73-80 (depicting a sample information form suggested for use in obtaining a physical
description and other relevant information about the intended victim, or "mark").
21 See id. at 87-94. Chapter 6 is titled "Opportunity Knocks: Finding Employment,
What to Charge, Who to Avoid." Id. at 87.
29 See id. at 21-36. Chapter 2 is titled "Equipment: Selection and Purpose." Id. at 21.
30 "The AR-7 rifle has a serial number stamped on the case, just above the clip port.
This number should be completely drilled out. The hole left will be unsightly but will
not interfere with the working mechanism of the gun or the clip feed." Id. at 23.
" See id. at 37-52. Chapter 3 is titled "The Disposable Silencer: A Poor Man's
Access to a Rich Man's Toy." Id. at 37.
32 See id. at 25.
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In oral argument on the summary judgment motion, Paladin highlighted
several factors belying the plaintiffs' assertion that the book was meant to
be taken seriously.33 Among the factors cited were the cartoon-like cover
illustration, the sometimes ridiculously pompous and egotistical tone of the
author, and apparent inconsistencies in certain of the author's instructions
when considered with others.34 Paladin also told the district court that the
prosecutor in the case against Perry marveled that Perry had taken such a
book seriously.35 In addition, Paladin stressed the fact that Perry did not
follow each and every instruction contained in the book.36 Indeed, if he
were to have done so, Paladin asserted, Perry would have eluded authori-
ties.37
" See David Montgomery, Judge Doubts Publisher Is Liable in Md. Triple Murder,
WASH. POST, July 23, 1996, at D3; see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendant Paladin Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 32,
Rice (AW-95-3811) [hereinafter Memorandum] (noting the "unavoidable signals" that
Hit Man is "fiction").
34 See Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Pala-
din Enterprises, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Rice (AW-95-3811) [here-
inafter Reply Memorandum].
[D]espite plaintiffs' tireless efforts to dismiss Hit Man as a "murder manu-
al," . . . the book itself is simply not that. From its cartoon-like cover, to the
transparent and exaggerated pseudonym of its author, to its mystery novel-like
tales of his "adventures," to the obvious absurdity of much of the "instruction" it
purports to relate, . . . [t]he book contains not a single word that can reasonably
be said to direct or encourage anyone to engage in "imminent lawless" conduct
and, in fact, includes an express warning to the contrary.
Id. But see Rice, 128 F.3d at 254 ("[W]e are of the view that the book so overtly pro-
motes murder in concrete, nonabstract terms that we regard as disturbingly disingen-
uous ... Paladin's cavalier suggestion that the book is essentially a comic book whose
'fantastical' promotion of murder no one could take seriously .... ").
31 See Memorandum, supra note 33, at 8 (citing Transcript, Sept. 13, 1995, at 5,
State v. Perry (Mont. County Cir. Ct.) (Crim. No. 72050)). 'it should be noted that the
prosecutor in the criminal case against Perry relied upon the fact that Perry used such a
book as evidence of the calculative element of Perry's crimes. See Transcript, Sept. 23,
1995, at 125-26, 157, State v. Perry (Mont. County Cir. Ct.) (Crim. No. 72050).
72050); Transcript, Oct. 3, 1995, at 25-35, State v. Perry (Mont. County Cir. Ct.)
(Crim. No. 72050). 72050).
36 See Memorandum, supra note 33, at 10.
3 See Thomas Kelly, Counsel for Defendant Paladin Enterprises, Oral Argument
(July 22,1996) (transcript available in United States District Court, District of Maryland,
Southern Division). "Moreover, if my advice and the proven methods in this book are
followed, certainly no one will ever know." FERAL, supra note 18, at ix.
572 [Vol. 6:2
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III. THE DEBATE
At the heart of the legal debate is the difficulty many scholars have in
distinguishing between the book Hit Man and certain movies, fictional liter-
ature, and music containing some of the same kinds of information, which,
when it falls into the wrong hands, becomes a danger to innocent individu-
als.3" Indeed, a number of cases have involved so-called copycat or imita-
tive crimes in which an individual or group emulated crimes or dangerous
activity represented in books, movies, songs, and magazines. In such cas-
es, courts have examined the speech at issue under the "incitement to immi-
nent lawless activity" analysis established by the United States Supreme
Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio,4" and have determined that the speech did
3 Bruce Sanford has written that Rice threatens "a destabilizing effect on First
Amendment law" because of the absence of a "principled distinction between constitu-
tional protection for the type of information found in [Hit Man] and protection for
identical or similar information found in a vast array of fiction, nonfiction, music, elec-
tronic communication, and video programming." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Affirmance at 22, 2, Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-
2412) [hereinafter Support Brief].
" See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (reversing a jury's award of damages in a wrongful death
action against a magazine publisher for an adolescent's death allegedly caused by an
article that described the practice of auto-erotic asphyxia); Zamora v. CBS, 480 F.
Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (discussing a fifteen-year old's unsuccessful suit against
television networks for violent programming to which he allegedly became addicted and
that allegedly caused him to kill an elderly woman); McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr.
187 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the Ozzy Ozbourne song "Suicide Solution," pro-
pounding the acceptable nature of suicide, merited protected-speech status); Olivia N. v.
NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982) (dismiss-
ing an action brought by a minor girl raped with a bottle by other juveniles imitating a
similar incident depicted in a television drama for failure to state a valid cause of ac-
tion); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (dis-
missing the wrongful death action by the father of a boy killed by a person who had
just seen the film The Warriors, which depicted scenes of gang violence); DeFilippo v.
NBC, 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (discussing a wrongful death action brought against
NBC by parents of a deceased boy after he hanged himself while imitating a stunt dem-
onstrated on The Tonight Show hosted by Johnny Carson).
395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally that took place
on a farm outside of Cincinnati. A reporter from a local television station had been
invited to film the rally. Portions of the film were later broadcast, showing Klan mem-
bers denouncing Blacks, Jews, and the national government. On the film, Klan leader
Brandenburg stated that "if our President, our Congress, and our Supreme Court, contin-
ues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken." Id. at 446. The Court struck down the State's conviction of
Brandenburg, holding that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
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not constitute "incitement." '41 Critics like media litigator Bruce Sanford
warn of the extensive litigation that would result from a decision that would
leave Hit Man unprotected by the First Amendment, in view of the many
works of artistic expression containing graphic information similar to that
set forth in Hit Man.42 Others have articulated support for a narrowly de-
fined interpretation of "intent," one which might facilitate a solution to the
Hit Man problem without chilling artistic expression.43
The Brandenburg standard as applied by the Supreme Court contains three
elements: intent, imminence, and likelihood." These three elements prove
useful in analyzing the claims at issue in the case against Paladin.
A. Brandenburg Intent
The first element, intent, was the subject of vigorous debate ,at the sum-
mary judgment stage of Rice.45 Defendant Paladin asserted that it did not
intend to incite violence through the publication and marketing of Hit Man,
while at the same time conceding-for purposes of summary judgment on-
ly-that "[i]n publishing, marketing, advertising and distributing Hit Man
and Silencers, [it] intended and had knowledge that their [sic] publications
would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to plan
and execute the crime of murder for hire, in the manner set forth in the
publications."46 Paladin reconciled this apparent self-contradiction by as-
serting that "'subjective intent' is [not] at all relevant to the Brandenburg
test."'47 Paladin further stated, "The 'directed to' prong of the Brandenburg
test is an objective standard, which looks only to the words themselves and
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447.
41 See cases cited supra note 39.
42 See Support Brief, supra note 38, at 22.
4' See Taylor, supra note 5, at 22:
[W]hile no reputable publisher "intends" to facilitate murder-in the sense of
publishing with that purpose-many arguably have depicted violent crimes or
fantasies with "reckless disregard" for the possibility that they might inspire copy-
cat crimes. Unless the courts define "intent" more narrowly in this context than in
many others ... a flood of litigation could indeed ensue.
4' See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
41 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844-48.
46 Id. at 840. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disregarded Paladin's
"intent" distinction entirely, focusing on Paladin's stipulation as interpreted via the com-
mon meaning of the word, see Rice, 128 F.3d at 252-53, except to note that "of course,
the district court was without authority to allow Paladin to alter the parties' stipulation
unilaterally . . . ." Id. at 253.
4 Reply Memorandum, supra note 34, at 2.
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the context in which they were disseminated."4 In response to the
plaintiffs' assertion that no other publisher would "stipulate to knowledge
and intent,"49 Paladin stated: "[T]here can be no question that even authors
of fiction know that their readership includes criminals who will employ, to
the extent they find them useful, technically accurate descriptions of assassi-
nation methods contained in such works." 50
This argument convinced the district court,5 but is it the law?52 Pala-
din appears to have argued that subjective intent was not a part of the First
Amendment analysis, maintaining that the question of whether it published
with subjective intent-versus the "knowledge" brand of intent to which it
asserted it stipulated-is irrelevant to the outcome of Rice, because it cannot
be held liable unless the words in Hit Man somehow can be viewed objec-
tively as embodying intent. Paladin's definition of Brandenburg intent seems
to be intent that can be objectively distinguished within the speech at issue.
This intent cannot be identified in the language of Hit Man, Paladin main-
tained.53
4I Id. at 111. On this point, Paladin referenced Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09
(1973), stating that "intent to incite imminent lawless action must be gleaned from 'the
import of the language."' Id. In addition, Paladin referenced NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929 (1982), stating that the "court must focus upon the
defendants' 'speeches themselves."' Id.
49 Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 16, at 37.
5 Reply Memorandum, supra note 34, at 15. On this point, Paladin's examples
included Tom Clancy's novel Without Remorse, Dave Fisher's "Joey" series, and Ste-
phen King's novel Rage. See id.
5' The district court wrote:
Defendants conceded that they intended that their publications would be used by
criminals to plan and execute murder as instructed in the manual. However, De-
fendants clarify their concession by explaining that when they published, adver-
tised and distributed both Hit Man and Silencers, they knew, and in that sense
"intended," that the books would be purchased by all of the categories of readers
previously described and used by them for the broad range of purposes previously
described.
Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 846 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
52
In the First Amendment realm, as indeed throughout the law of crimes and torts,
subjective intent is often the very essence of the case, the fact on which responsi-
bility hangs or falls. The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly emphasized the often
outcome-determinative role of intent in First Amendment cases.
Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 16, at 20 (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476
(1993), as "holding that defendants' subjective intent was sufficient to overcome assert-
ed First Amendment defense in bias-crime prosecution," and Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153 (1979), as "emphasizing the role of subjective intent in libel cases governed
by the First Amendment.")
" See Montgomery, supra note 5, at B1.
1998]
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This objective-intent argument cannot withstand close scrutiny. Consider
the words of Judge Kennedy in United States v. Freeman,54 a case about
solicitation to commit tax fraud. Kennedy noted that "the First Amendment
is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the objective meaning of the
words used are so close in time and purpose to a substantive evil as to be-
come part of the ultimate crime itself."" The court thus applied a two-part
analysis that included the subjective intent of the actor plus the objective
meaning of the words-not the meaning of the words under a variety of
undeniably subjective interpretations.
Paladin itself advanced a number of interpretations for the speech con-
tained in Hit Man. Among these were that the book contains "unavoidable
signals [that it is] fiction,"56 that it is "[u]nlike fictional works ... [in that
it] reveals, in stark relief, the reality and violence of the act of kill-
ing,... and otherwise counsels sober reflection on the topic,"57 that it is
"not meant to be taken seriously,""8 and that there is value to society in the
book because it is a valuable learning tool for law enforcement personnel
and "criminologists and others who study criminal methods and mentali-
ty."59 Though these assertions in combination are problematic and self-con-
tradictory, it becomes unnecessary to evaluate any of them under the Free-
man analysis, for the objective meaning of the words on their face, in com-
bination with the actor's intent, are the sole determining factors. This is alto-
gether different from Paladin's assertion that the court must determine
whether intent objectively may be gleaned from the speech. Freeman again
raises the question of whether the Brandenburg test, a First Amendment
analysis, even applies to this case. A finding of intent on the part of Paladin,
combined with a consideration of the objective meaning of the speech in Hit
Man, a relatively simple task in itself, would seem to indicate that Rice is
not a First Amendment case at all.
The district court's endorsement of an interpretation of Brandenburg that
requires a finding of objectively apparent intent is unsettling. The district
court appears to have closed its eyes to the implications of such an endorse-
"' 761 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1120 (1986); see also infra
note 78.
55 Freeman, 761 F.2d at 552 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit relied on
Freeman in rejecting Paladin's claim to First Amendment protection. See Rice, 128 F.3d
at 245.
56 Memorandum, supra note 33, at 32.
57 Id.
5' The Associated Press, Suit Follows Murder by the Book: Publisher of How-To Hit
Man Manual Is Blamed in 3 Killings, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 23, 1996, at A18, available
in LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDY File. "Paladin's president, Peder C. Lund, said in
an April 19[, 1996], affidavit that the book was not meant to be taken seriously." Id.
" Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840; see also Reply Memorandum, supra note 34, at 1 (cit-
ing Joint Statement of Facts 5, 8).
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ment. In effect, the court said that although Paladin intended that its manual
would be used upon receipt by criminals and would-be criminals to plan and
carry out the crime of murder for hire, Paladin did not intend it in the
"right," or culpable, sense.' This proposition-that there are different
"brands" of intent, of which the Brandenburg "brand" is just one-is quite
confusing, and it is difficult to find legal authority for it. Indeed, the court
cited none.
The court then proceeded to effectively neutralize the relevance of hav-
ing recognized the proposition in the first place. With no further explanation
of the basis for proposing different brands of intent, the court moved direct-
ly into a discussion of the idea that Paladin had not conceded to the requi-
site intent because Brandenburg mandates that intent must be to incite immi-
nent lawless action.61 Under the district court's analysis, then, the element
of intent in Rice is inextricably linked to the element of imminence. The
court wrote: "While the Defendants have conceded that they intended for
their books to be purchased and actually used by criminals, they have not
conceded to the requisite intent. Under Brandenburg, the Defendants must
have intended imminent lawless action., 62 "Paladin knew, and in that sense
'intended,' that the books would be" 63 put to use by criminals and would-
be criminals upon receipt.'M If "upon receipt" were not to qualify as immi-
nent, it would seem that, under the district court's analysis, Paladin might
just as well have openly intended (in the objective definition of the word61)
o Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
While the Defendants have conceded that they intended for their books to be
purchased and actually used by criminals, they have not conceded to the requisite
intent. Under Brandenburg, the Defendants must have intended imminent lawless
action .... [N]othing in Hit Man and Silencers could be characterized as a com-
mand to immediately murder the three victims.
Id.
61 See id. at 847-48.
62 Id. at 847.
In other words, Defendants must have intended that James Perry would go out
and murder Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders immediately. That
did not happen in this case since the parties have stipulated to the fact that James
Perry committed these atrocious murders a year after receiving the books. Just as
in McCollum, nothing in Hit Man ... could be characterized as a command to
immediately murder the three victims.
Id. (citations omitted).
63 Reply Memorandum, supra note 34, at 14.
See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840. "In publishing, marketing, advertising and distrib-
uting Hit Man and Silencers, Paladin intended and had knowledge that their [sic] publi-
cations would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to plan and
execute the crime of murder for hire, in the manner set forth in the publications." Id.
65 "Intend" is defined as "to have in mind as something to be done or brought
about ... to design or mean for a particular purpose, use, recipient, etc .... to have a
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that its book be used by criminals, for it would appear that the imminence
prong of Brandenburg simply cannot be met on the facts of Rice.
That the district court felt the need to attempt a distinction between
Paladin's "intent" and Brandenburg's "intent" suggests that Brandenburg
may not apply to Rice at all. If Paladin were to have "kn[own], and in that
sense 'intended,""'6 then this distinction would appear to approach the fore-
seeability analysis that is characteristic of the negligence approach found in
tort law, rather than the somewhat cursory Brandenburg analysis in which
the district court engaged.
B. The Riddle of Brandenburg Imminence in Rice
The district court reasoned that the only unprotected class of speech
under which Hit Man might conceivably fall is speech likely to incite immi-
nent lawless action-the Brandenburg analysis.67 Thus, the court consid-
ered the distinction drawn in Brandenburg between incitement and mere
advocacy,6" as well as whether the speech in Hit Man constitutes incite-
ment or advocacy.
The inquiry into whether speech constitutes incitement or advocacy
explores two aspects of the speech: "the content of the speech . . . [and] the
context in which it [i]s disseminated."69 The district court's analysis of this
issue resulted in the conclusion that Hit Man did not constitute incitement in
the Brandenburg sense because Paladin did not intend that Perry murder the
three victims immediately." The court found that Hit Man simply advocat-
ed murder for hire by explaining how it may be effectuated.7' The court
purpose or design." RANDOM HOUSE COMPACT UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 991 (Special
2d ed. 1996).
66 See supra text accompanying note 63.
67 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844.
" See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (holding that advocacy is
protected, but incitement is not protected).
6' Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 845. "[T]he line between permissible advocacy and imper-
missible incitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in which the
speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say." Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976).
[T]he question is one of alleged trespass across "the line between speech uncondi-
tionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated." In cases
where that line must be drawn, the rule is that we "examine for ourselves the
statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ...
whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment ...
protect."
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 334 (1946))
(citations omitted).
70 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
71 See id.
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additionally noted that Hit Man did not constitute a "call to action."" Con-
sidering the preface to Hit Man,"' one is compelled to ask where this type
of braggadocian dare might fall along the continuum leading from advocacy
to incitement.
An examination of the word "imminent" is in order. At least one court
has held that "imminent" does not mean "immediate" in all instances, but
rather, that imminence is a relative term.74 The position taken by the plain-
tiffs in Rice echoed this interpretation: "A training manual for murder pub-
lished over a span of years and distributed to a broad range of readers com-
mands a rolling conception of imminence; Defendants cannot hide behind
temporal uncertainty of their own creation, in which the assassins they train
and encourage may strike at any time."" Moreover, what result must be
imminent? The plaintiffs asserted that it was not the deaths of the victims,
but rather, "the commencement of lawless action."" All parties have stipu-
lated that Paladin intended that, upon receipt, criminals and would-be crimi-
nals would begin to use Hit Man and Silencers to plan and execute the
Nothing in the book says "go out and commit murder now!" Instead, the book
seems to say, in so many words, "if you want to be a hit man this is what you
need to do." This is advocacy, not incitement. Advocacy is defined as mere ab-
stract teaching .... The Court finds that the book merely teaches what must be
done to implement a professional hit.
Id. (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448).
72 Id. (citing Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199, 204 (1979) (citing Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 322 (1957))).
73
When the bragging and boasting starts, I just sit back and smile as one after the
other talks of what he would do, and how he would be, if it weren't for family
obligations, mortgages and corporate jobs.
You might be like my friends-interested but unsure .... Step by step you
will be taken from research to equipment selection to job preparation to successful
job completion ....
But deny your urge to skip about, looking for the "good" parts. Start where
any amateur who is serious about turning professional will start-at the begin-
ning.
FERAL, supra note 18, at x-xi.
" See People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492-93 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
821 (1980).
But time is a relative dimension and imminence a relative term, and the immi-
nence of an event is related to its nature .... Murder, the most serious crime of
all, carries the longest time span of any crime, as shown by the lack of any time
limitation on its prosecution and a threat of murder can be imminent at a time
when a threat of trespass is not.
Id. (citation omitted).
" Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 16, at 12.
76 Id.
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crime of murder for hire.77 Is this the incitement of imminent lawless ac-
tion according to Brandenburg? After all, conspiracy to commit murder,
solicitation of murder, and attempted murder are all lawless activities ad-
vanced by Hit Man.7 The question is whether Paladin incited these activi-
ties and whether they were imminent.
At common law, the crime of murder, as distinguished from manslaugh-
ter, contains the element of malice aforethought.79 Furthermore, first degree
murder-the crime that formed the basis for this suit-contains the element
of premeditation.0 Hit Man is about first-degree murder because murder
See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840.
78 Regarding solicitation to commit murder, consider Judge Kennedy's opinion in
United States v. Freeman:
Though a statute proscribes certain speech, in this case counseling, the defendant
does not have a First Amendment defense simply for the asking. Counseling is
but a variant of the crime of solicitation, and the First Amendment is quite irrele-
vant if the intent of the actor and the objective meaning of the words used are so
close in time and purpose to a substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate
crime itself.
761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1120 (1986) (citing United
States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Buttorff, 572
F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978)).
71 See McCord v. State, 289 A.2d 7, 10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 266 Md.
739 (1972).
80 See MD. CODE ANN. CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS § 407 (1957).
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if,
in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or
another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodi-
ly harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary
manslaughter.
JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL LAw 399-400 (3d ed. 1995).
Murder ... is the killing of any person in the peace of the commonwealth, with
malice aforethought, either express or implied by law. Malice ... is used in a
technical sense, including not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other
unlawful and unjustifiable motive. It is not confined to ill-will towards one or
more individual persons, but is intended to denote an action flowing from any
wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been
attended with such circumstances, as carry in them the plain indications of a heart
regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief.
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 295, 304 (1850).
Compare murder with manslaughter, "the unlawful killing of another without mal-
ice." Id. (emphasis added).
"A murder is not premeditated unless the thought of taking life was consciously
conceived and the act or admission by which it was taken was intended. Premeditated
murder is murder committed after the formation of a specific intent to kill someone and
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for hire is inextricably linked to premeditation; murder for hire does not
happen by accident.
Because of this requisite element of calculation, it is quite possible that
no individual or group is capable of being incited to the "imminent" act of
premeditated murder, as opposed to the imminent act of murder or man-
slaughter. Under the district court's analysis, this would seem to be the case,
for the district court unwittingly substituted "to murder" for "to kill,""1 by
focusing, in computing the time lapse between Perry's receipt of the book
and his entry into lawless activity, on when the three victims actually
died.82 This is a longer period of time than could have been calculated,
making Perry's actions consummate with the concept of a first-degree mur-
der, rather than that of a sudden killing, such as manslaughter. The district
court applied Brandenburg and effectively determined that murder for
hire-premeditated murder-thus cannot be incited in an immediate fashion.
Applying Brandenburg in this way, however, allows Hit Man to operate as
its own defense; if premeditated murder could not be incited in an "immi-
nent" fashion, then Hit Man by definition could not create liability.
In its Brandenburg analysis the district court curiously ignored the fact
that Hit Man is about murder for hire, not the act of murder alone. If "im-
minence" were to be interpreted as "immediacy"-as in the district court's
analysis83-how are we to measure or evaluate the time it necessarily
would take the hit man to transact the solicitation of and agreement with the
individual seeking his services? In other words, what length of time is con-
sidered "immediate?"
Under the district court's application of Brandenburg, murder for
hire-premeditated murder--cannot be incited in an immediate fashion.
Because Brandenburg allows Hit Man to operate as its own defense in this
way, one is left to wonder whether Brandenburg can even apply in this
case, or whether another model for legal analysis should be sought. If courts
were to insist on adhering to Brandenburg, then the only resolution of this
consideration of the act intended." COOK & MARCUS, supra, at 464.
8" "[N]othing in Hit Man... could be characterized as a command to immediately
murder the three victims." Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847 (emphasis added).
82 "Defendants must have intended that James Perry would go out and murder Mil-
dred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders immediately. That did not happen in this
case since the parties have stipulated to the fact that James Perry committed these atro-
cious murders a year after receiving the books." Id. (citation omitted).
The court inadvertently used the word "murder" here. Employed in this context,
"murder" plainly means "kill" because the court focused on the death of the victims, as
opposed to the Perry's actions; his acts of planning and premeditation (elements of
murder) that took place long before the actual killings. Note again the distinction evi-
dent between the two words when "murder" is employed in its statutory sense-and the
crucial import of the district court's disregard for the statutory elements of murder.
83 See id.
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apparent riddle would be that "imminent" simply cannot mean "immediate"
in all cases, and most specifically, in this case. A question then exists re-
garding what to do with this portion of the district court's opinion. If "im-
minent" were not to mean "immediate," then its meaning would run along
the lines of the plaintiffs' interpretation-based on existing law-and con-
trary to Paladin's interpretation, endorsed by the district court. Although the
district court concluded, according to this interpretation, that Brandenburg
bars imposition of civil liability in this case, it appears that it may not.
C. Brandenburg Likelihood
One final aspect remains for consideration under Brandenburg, and it is
the aspect that ties the Brandenburg mandate together: likelihood.' Speech
undeserving of First Amendment protection is that which "is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action.' 85 According to the district court, Hit Man is unlikely to
incite violence: "Nor does the book have a tendency to incite violence. The
court noted that out of the 13,000 copies of Hit Man that have been sold na-
tionally, one person actually used the information over the ten years that the
book has been in circulation."86 The district court further reasoned that Hit
Man's disclaimers did "not indicate a tendency to incite violence. To the
contrary, such disclaimers may be interpreted as an attempt to dissuade
readers from engaging in the activity it describes."87
This is a remarkable stretch of logic. Whereas disclaimers attached to
other known instructional materials relating to illegal or questionable activi-
84 See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
" Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added).
86 Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848. More accurately, only one person was caught using the
information. Though arguably not relevant to Rice, Paladin books frequently have been
utilized by criminals. See, e.g., Juliet Dee, When Classified Ads Lead to Murder:
Hitmen, Soldier of Fortune, and the Question of Commercial Speech, COMM. & L.,
Mar. 1996, at 54 ("Dr. Park Dietz, a forensic psychiatrist and consultant to the FBI,
'often encounters patients who have read Paladin books, including two serial killers re-
sponsible for 16 deaths."') (quoting Erik Larson, Libraries of Killers Often Include a
Book or Two From Paladin, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1993, at Al, and Charlie Brennan,
Publisher Sued Over Hit-Man Book: Paladin Press, Based in Boulder, Sued by Kin of
Contract-Killer Victims, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Jan. 31, 1996, at 5A,
available in LEXIS, News Library, RMTNEW File); Christopher Goodwin, Village
Worthy Is Killing-Book King, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 1996, Home News
Section, available in LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File ("The lawsuit against Lund
has brought his bizarre enterprise under scrutiny for the first time. An agent of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms said last week that Paladin books had been
found in the possession of bombing suspects 'hundreds of times."').
87 Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848.
582 [Vol. 6:2
MURDER IN THE ABSTRACT
ties have used such wording as "DON'T TRY ANYTHING YOU FIND IN THIS
DOCUMENT!!!, '""8 or, "DO NOT ATTEMPT this method,"89 the "disclaimers"
contained in Hit Man conspicuously do not direct the reader to refrain from
engaging in the activity of murder for hire.9" At most, Paladin simply states
that the activity advanced is illegal, and that the publisher assumes no re-
sponsibility for that illegal activity in the event that the reader-turned-hit
man gets caught,9' as Perry did. Insofar as the argument has been made
that Hit Man's "disclaimers" discredit a finding of likelihood--or intent, for
that matter-the argument necessarily must be buttressed by conclusions
drawn from reading the disclaimers in the best possible light, but not con-
clusions supported by the objective language of the disclaimers.
III. DOES BRANDENBURG APPLY TO RICE?
Although the district court found that Brandenburg applied to the fact
pattern of Rice, the plaintiffs and others have maintained that it does not.92
In Brandenburg, the Court framed its opinion specifically in terms of violent
crowd behavior and assembly: "[W]e are here confronted with a statute
which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy
and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely
to advocate the described type of action."93 Other courts have recognized
the importance of limiting Brandenburg to the context of crowd behavior,
Dan Mihalopoulos, The Web, Where Bomb-Makers Go To Learn: Despite Safety
Concerns After Olympics Bombing, Instructions on Net Are Legal, Can't Be Stopped,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, FIVE STAR LIFr EDITION, Aug. 4, 1996, at 4B, available in
LEXIS, News Library, SLPD File.
89 Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (reversing a jury's award of damages in a wrongful death
action against a magazine publisher for an adolescent's death allegedly caused by an
article that described the practice of auto-erotic asphyxia).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 18, 22-23.
9' See supra text accompanying notes 18, 22-23.
92
In any event, the Brandenburg line of cases is distinguishable. They focused
mainly on revolutionary political rhetoric and mass protests. And the court's pur-
pose was to draw a line between abstract advocacy of violence and actual face-to-
face incitement, which tends to produce violent behavior either right away or not
at all. Where something like a murder manual is involved, violent intent may
foreseeably lead to violent results even absent "imminence" in the strict sense.
Taylor, supra note 5, at 22.
"Critics of the lawsuit are confusing public debate by raising the 'freedom of speech'
mantra. Instead, the question for the court-and for the court of public opinion-should
be whether this book was a critical instrument in causing the violence." Charles G.
Brown, Murder by the Book, and Its Consequences, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 1996, at N13.
93 395 U.S. at 449.
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advocacy, and efforts to steel a group to violent action.94 In fact, "[t]he
long train of celebrated Supreme Court opinions dealing with such issues as
advocacy of violence, incitement, symbolic speech, and graphic protest have
all involved speech pertaining to political or social issues."95 Hit Man con-
tains no such political or social discourse.96 The district court noted, "It is
simply not acceptable to a free and democratic society to limit and restrict
creativity in order to avoid dissemination of ideas in artistic speech which
may adversely affect emotionally troubled individuals."'
In a case that so many have described as a test of the First Amend-
ment,9" the legal profession might do well to recall the historical founda-
' See, e.g., Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023.
But the parties' and, apparently, the district court's effort to apply the
Brandenburg analysis to the type of "incitement" with which Hustler was charged
appears inappropriate. Incitement cases usually concern a state effort to punish the
arousal of a crowd to commit a criminal action. The root of incitement theory
appears to have been grounded in concern over crowd behavior. As John Stuart
Mill stated in his dissertation, On Liberty, "An opinion that corn-dealers are
starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery ought to be unmolested
when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of the corn-deal-
er." In Noto v. United States, [367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)], the Supreme Court
expressed similar views about incitement: "the mere abstract teaching ... of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action."
Whether written material might ever be found to create culpable incitement unpro-
tected by the [F]irst [A]mendment is, however, a question that we do not now
reach.
Id. (citations omitted).
' Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 16, at 22 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989) (flag burning to protest Republican Party policies); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (civil rights boycott); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105 (1973) (Vietnam protest); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (vulgar anti-
draft message); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 705 (1969) (racist and anti-Semitic pro-
paganda); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (Vietnam protest); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (communist party materials); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937) (civil rights and communist party materials); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927) (communist labor party convention); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) (World War I protest); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(World War I protest)).
9 "It is instruction, pure and simple, in the dark arts of mercenary murder." Id. at
23.
9 Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848 (citing Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Mass. 1989); McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App.
1988)).
98 "'Paladin is putting the First Amendment unnecessarily at risk in order to save the
expense of a jury trial,' said Arthur Spitzer, an attorney with the national office of the
ACLU, based in Washington, D.C." Catherine M. Brennan, 'How-To' Murder Manual
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tion for that Amendment and its applicability-or inapplicability-to Rice:
The bedrock principle animating the First Amendment is that
the government may not censor speech on the basis of view-
point. In this case, however, Plaintiffs seek no censorship on
the basis of viewpoint. Plaintiffs do not invite a jury to pun-
ish the Defendants because their speech is revolting, disgust-
ing, or morally repugnant. This is not an offensive speech
case; not an advocacy of unpopular ideas case. This is a case
about tort liability for aiding and abetting murder. The grava-
men of the Plaintiffs' cause of action is not a reader's intel-
lectual or emotional disgust at the evil of the Defendants
[sic] publication. This suit is not about taking sides in the
marketplace of ideas; indeed, it is not about ideas at all. This
suit is about recompense for physical injury and death, sub-
stantially caused by the dissemination of Defendants' instruc-
tion manual for murder, a manual that was used in this case
precisely as the words in the book itself instructed that it
should be used. Defendants are free to publish Hit Man.
They are not free to escape compensation for the injury they
knowingly and recklessly aided and abetted.99
The district court concluded that, "although morally repugnant, [Hit
Man] does not constitute incitement or 'a call to action."" '  The district
court further concluded that Brandenburg is the appropriate legal test for Hit
Man because the book "involves speech which advocates or teaches lawless
activity, in this case murder."'' 1
Advocacy was central to the holding of Brandenburg,"° and therefore
Case Tests First Amendment Limits: Paladin Press Gambles That 'Hit Man' Is Protect-
ed Even If It's Aimed at Would-Be Killers, But Free-Speech Backers Say That's a Risky
Line, DAILY REC. (Baltimore), July 24, 1996, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library,
DLYREC File. "'[I]t sounds like a law school exam that ... tests the boundaries of the
First Amendment," said Floyd Abrams. Montgomery, supra note 5, at B1.
99 Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 16, at 23 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
" Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847 (quoting Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.
Fla. 1979)).
10 Id. at 845.
102 The criminal statute at issue proscribed "'advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform' . . . and for 'voluntarily assembl[ing] with
any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines
of criminal syndicalism."' Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.13 (Anderson 1969)). The Court held that
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deserves particularly close analysis. First, the district court in Rice reasoned
that Hit Man did "not cross that line between permissible advocacy and
impermissible incitation to crime or violence."'' 3 To draw such a conclu-
sion, the district court began with the presumption that Hit Man was permis-
sible advocacy." To the contrary, Hit Man is not advocacy at
all-permissible or otherwise.
The district court stated, "Advocacy is defined as mere abstract teach-
ing,"" and thus the court misunderstood the fundamental message of
Brandenburg. The Court in Brandenburg quoted Noto v. United States' 6
for the proposition that "'mere abstract teaching. . . of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." '' ' 7 The
district court in Rice stated that Hit Man "merely teaches what must be done
to implement a professional hit.""'° This, however, is not the "'abstract
teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence.""' 9 Indeed, it emphatically is not the advocacy addressed
and defined by the Court in Brandenburg."' Again, the district court fum-
bled with basic legal vocabulary-this time with language clearly set forth
in Brandenburg. In Brandenburg, the Court specifically defined the type of
advocacy not to be proscribed, and that advocacy was not simply "mere
abstract teaching,' as the district court erroneously concluded." 2
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447.
103 Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 66 (1976)).
" "Nothing in the book says, 'go out and commit murder now!' Instead, the book
seems to say, in so many words, 'if you want to be a hit man this is what you need to
do.' This is advocacy, not incitement." Id.
1o5 Id.
106 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
107 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-98) (emphasis add-
ed).
108 Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
109 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-98).
110
Hit Man's detailed, concrete instructions and adjurations to murder stand in stark
contrast to the vague, rhetorical threats of politically or socially motivated vio-
lence that have historically been considered part and parcel of the impassioned
criticism of laws, policies, and government indispensable in a free society and
rightly protected under Brandenburg.
Rice, 128 F.3d at 262.
"' Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
112 Additionally, the district court failed to discuss what made Hit Man so "abstract"
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Because Brandenburg advocacy is not "mere teaching," and Hit Man is
mere teaching, Hit Man is not Brandenburg advocacy. It is for this reason
that Hit Man cannot "cross the line" between permissible Brandenburg ad-
vocacy and impermissible incitation. Hit Man cannot cross this finish line
because it cannot begin at the appropriate starting point.
IV. THE ISSUE OF RESPONSIBLE SPEECH
Concerns over holding-the publisher of Hit Man liable for foreseeable
harm to three innocent people spring from a fundamental concern that such
a decision would implicate not only this publisher's free speech interest, but
also that of a host of authors, movie makers, and other artists. In short, there
is a concern that artistic expression will be reined in by state action banning
any expression that the state may deem undesirable or unpopular. One may
ask, however, whether holding the publisher of Hit Man liable in this in-
stance would really endanger such rights in light of the historic purposes
undergirding the First Amendment. 3
Sir William Blackstone wrote:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state, but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matters when published. Every free man has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press;
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity .... "'
in its teaching. As the Fourth Circuit noted, "[a]ny argument that Hit Man is abstract
advocacy entitling the book, and therefore Paladin, to heightened First Amendment
protection under Brandenburg, is, on its face, untenable." Rice, 128 F.3d at 255.
"Indeed, one finds in Hit Man little, if anything, even remotely characterizable as the
abstract criticism that Brandenburg jealously protects." Id. at 262.
13 Three dominant theories have emerged in the free speech tradition: (1) The Mar-
ketplace Theory: "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market," Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); (2) The Free Expression and Human Dignity Theory:
"The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the
human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression," Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); (3) The Democratic Self-Governance Theo-
ry: "'Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of government affairs,"' Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)). SMOLLA, supra note 3, at 6-17.
114 Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1402 (W.D.
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Although the plaintiffs in Rice did not seek a prior ban on the speech con-
tained in Hit Man, some legal scholars have articulated support for such an
idea. "5 The plaintiffs, however, merely sought compensation in tort for the
damage facilitated by the speech contained in Hit Man.
V. THE COPYCAT CASES
The concern over a potential chilling of artistic expression as the result
of Rice is fundamentally flawed. This concern harkens back to the copycat,
Ark. 1987). Judge Franklin Waters noted:
It does no violence to the value of freedom of speech and press to impose a duty
of reasonable care upon those who would exercise such freedoms; the states have
a substantial interest in encouraging speakers to carefully seek the truth before
they communicate, as well as in compensating persons actually harmed by false
descriptions of their personal behavior. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard
of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.
Id. at 1400 (quoting 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 506, at 344 (1979)).
Norwood held Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., liable for printing a gun-for-hire ad-
vertisement that led to the attempted murder of the plaintiff.
"' For those who remain uncomfortable with holding liable a publisher of such a
book as Hit Man, consider one legal scholar's theory:
An arch legal principle holds persons civilly liable for the criminal conduct of
others in a variety of circumstances. Landlords are responsible for failing to un-
dertake safety measures to protect tenants from crime that might reasonably be
anticipated. Gun dealers are similarly liable for sale to customers who they had
reason to believe would use the firearms in crime. Bar owners are open to liabili-
ty for alcohol sales to intoxicants who subsequently commit highway mayhem in
violation of DWI prohibitions.
The theory behind these liability rules is sound and simple: Citizens and busi-
nesses are obliged to act reasonably to avoid assisting or facilitating crimes that
might be reasonably anticipated. The reasonableness standard may dictate either
preventive action against crime or a refusal to deal with probable criminals in
ways that might advance their malevolent designs. As applied to Paladin Press,
the theory makes a persuasive case for liability.
... Paladin Press might reasonably have expected its manual to be purchased
and followed by a contract murderer like James Perry. In such circumstances, like
a gun dealer or bar owner, the law should saddle it with a duty to desist from
publication. That is a reasonable demand that society may require in the hopes of
reducing criminal conduct.
Drawing sensible lines is the hallmark of enlightened law. The First Amend-
ment is no exception. Experience discredits the ideas that to ban Hit Man: A
Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, is but a step away from banning
the Lincoln-Douglas debates.
Bruce Fein, Crime, Responsibility and Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at
A17.
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or imitative harm, cases discussed previously."6 One crucial distinction,
however, exists between these cases and Rice-a distinction that is central
to the principles advanced in Rice. In each of the copycat cases, material
presented for artistic, entertainment, or educational purposes depicted activi-
ties that were dangerous or violent. None of the publishers or broadcasters
involved in these cases expressed any intent that the activity depicted should
be emulated. In fact, in the case most closely analogous to the fact pattern
of Rice,' 7 the magazine article at issue contained an express editorial
warning.1 8 Thus, "[t]he crucial distinction between the copycat cases and
[Rice] is the distinction between misuse of someone else's ideas or informa-
tion, and use exactly as intended-in this case, use to commit murder."' 9
The court in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. stated, "[T]he explicit mean-
ing of the words employed, attempts to dissuade its readers from conducting
the dangerous activity it describes."' 2
The above discussion raises serious questions. For example, do disclaim-
ers or warnings serve as the definitive indication of an author's or
publisher's intent for use of a publication? The district court in Rice demon-
strated a heavy reliance on the disclaimers contained in Hit Man-although
the court's analysis of these disclaimers and their relevance to the likelihood
determination was arguably misguided, as previously discussed.' 2'
116 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
'" The case is Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). Herceg involved a wrongful death action brought by
the mother of a teenaged boy who had attempted a practice called auto-erotic asphyxia,
as described in a magazine article. "The practice entails masturbation while 'hanging'
oneself in order to temporarily cut of the blood supply to the brain at the moment of
orgasm." Id. at 1018.
18 See id. "'Hustler emphasizes the often-fatal dangers of the practice of "auto-erotic
asphyxia," and recommends that readers seeking unique forms of sexual release DO
NOT ATTEMPT this method. The facts are presented here solely for an educational.
purpose."' Id. (quoting the magazine's editorial warning).
"' Brief of Appellants at 40, Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-2412). Appellants continued:
In cases in which violent behavior is merely displayed or depicted for dramatic
purposes, the publisher will always, by definition, have as its purpose a value
related to public discourse, thus rendering the speech presumptively protected by
the First Amendment, and simultaneously rendering any attempt to hold the pub-
lisher liable problematic. When the manifest intent of the publisher is to train and
equip individuals for illegal activity, however, the harm that comes is not from
imitative behavior ... it is rather behavior that the publisher expects and intends
some number of its readers to engage in.
Id. at 42.
120 Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024.
1 See supra Part II.C.
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While a phrase such as "This book is not meant to be taken seriously,"
or "Do not attempt the illegal activity discussed in this book" could easily
have been included in the text of Hit Man's "disclaimers," no such language
appears. Paladin stressed the existence of these disclaimers in its defense,
but did not invite the court to examine the language of the disclaimers with
a view toward likening them to the disclaimers included in other cases cited
by it-most notably, the copycat cases. This is understandable, of course, in
light of the fact that Paladin's disclaimers were not as similar as it would
have liked for the court or the public to have believed. Nonetheless, even
the district court appears not to have read the disclaimers closely enough to
have noticed the curious dissimilarity to other case law, relevant to Rice
precisely because of this distinction.'
VI. BRANDENBURG INCITEMENT REVISITED
The district court wrote of Hit Man: "Nothing in the book says 'go out
and commit murder now!' Instead, the book seems to say, in so many
words, 'if you want to be a hit man this is what you need to do.' This is
advocacy, not incitement. Advocacy is defined as mere abstract teach-
ing."' 23 The Court in Noto v. United States, a case relied upon by the
Court in Brandenburg, wrote that "mere abstract teaching of ... the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such ac-
tion.""
The distinction made by the Court in Noto is important for two reasons.
First, the Court's exclusion of "preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action"'" from the definition of abstract teaching, or
"advocacy," contradicts the district court's definition of advocacy. The dis-
trict court in Rice determined that the language in Hit Man, language that on
its face prepares individuals for violent action and steels them to such ac-
tion--exactly as Paladin had stipulated it intended the book to function-is
,"advocacy." This interpretation is in direct contradiction of the Noto defini-
tion of advocacy, and thus the Brandenburg definition as well. Perhaps if
Hit Man were to have ended at the close of the preface, it could be viewed
as mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, but
it does not end there. The book proceeds to prepare the reader for violent
action."2 It is the difference between saying, "Yes, sometimes 'personal'
'- For disclaimers in their entirety, see supra text accompanying notes 18, 22-23.
'~ Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448).
"A 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
12 Id.
1 Even the preface reads, "Within the pages of this book you will learn one of the
most successful methods of operation used by an independent contractor. You will fol-
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justice" 7 requires that we take the law into our own hands," and saying,
"Yes, sometimes 'personal' justice requires that we take the law into our
own hands, and here is exactly how to do it." Hit Man does not advocate
the mere abstract idea of the moral necessity of a resort to violent ac-
tion;128 it instructs and prepares the reader to engage in that action. Con-
trary to the district court's perfunctory reading of the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the term, Hit Man is not advocacy.
Second, and more importantly, the Court in Brandenburg relied, on a
consideration of mere abstract teaching "of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence,"'' 9 as distinguished
from "preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such ac-
tion."' 30 This is an idea developed in the strict context of a group assem-
bly, and the Court's definition simply cannot be divorced from the context
in which it was developed.
CONCLUSION
It has been said that the publication of Hit Man did not cause the mur-
ders of Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders. It also has been
said that Hit Man did not incite James Perry to murder, in part because
Perry-and people like him-are predisposed to committing murder prior to
obtaining Hit Man. The latter assertion seems only to reinforce the fact that
Paladin not only "knew, and in that sense intended"'' that the book be
used by criminals in effectuating the crime of murder for hire, but also that
Paladin intended that the book be used by this intended audience to put an
already existent plan into action. As for the assertion that the publication of
Hit Man did not cause the murders of three people, consider the words of
low the procedures of a man who works alone .... [Y]ou will be taken from research
to equipment selection to job preparation to successful job completion." FERAL, supra
note 18, at x (emphasis added).
127 Id. at ix.
128 "It's not like people who prosecute flag burners or the Nazis or the Ku Klux
Klan, who wish to bar information because they disagree with their message....
[T]here is no message [in Hit Man] other than informational training on the art of being
a gun for hire. And that is not the kind of information that even triggers First Amend-
ment protection." Karen Bowers, Death Sentences: A Gruesome Triple Murder Puts a
Boulder Publisher and Its How-To-Kill Book in the Crosshairs, DENV. WESTWORD,
Mar. 21, 1996, Features, available in LEXIS, News Library, DNVWST File(quoting
Rodney A. Smolla, professor of law and First Amendment scholar).
129 Noto, 367 U.S. at 298.
130 Id.
13 Reply Memorandum, supra note 34, at 14.
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Justice Eagen, dissenting in the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v.
Root:'32
"It is a rule of both reason and the law that whenever one's
will contributes to impel a physical force, whether another's,
his own, or a combined force, proceeding from whatever
different sources, he is responsible for the result, the same as
though his hand, unaided, had produced it."
But, says the majority opinion, these are principles of
tort law and should not in these days be applied to the crimi-
nal law. But such has been the case since the time of
Blackstone. These same principles have always been ger-
mane to both crimes and tort.
' It is the people of the Commonwealth who are
harmed by the kind of conduct the defendant pursued. Their
interests must be kept in mind.'33
The wisdom of translating the treatment of a type of speech aimed at a
crowd into the context of a book aimed at individuals remains questionable,
and no court thus far has resolved it. The difficulties inherent in forcing the
speech in Hit Man into an analysis not framed to consider its special distin-
guishing characteristics must be recognized."34 Indeed, "the publication of
works that brazenly seek and foreseeably cause the slaughter of innocents"
was a "danger that seemed remote at the time of Brandenburg but now
seems very real."' 35
AMY K DIL WORTH
132 170 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1961).
133 Id. at 318 (Eagen, J. dissenting) (quoting 2 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 424
(1913)) (citations omitted).
134
Because free speech issues arise in an extraordinarily wide range of circumstances
and settings, the Supreme Court has not attempted to jam all free speech analysis
into the "incitement" standard of Brandenburg, but rather uses Brandenburg-style
analysis only in cases dealing with Brandenburg-style settings-namely speech on
issues of social or political concern, usually in the context of demonstrations and
rallies, in which authorities are concerned that matters are about to erupt into
violence. In the myriad of other areas outside of this context, the Supreme Court
has developed specialized First Amendment doctrines suited to the context at
hand-tests that do not mention or require "imminence" as used in Brandenburg.
Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 16, at 24.
135 Taylor, supra note 5, at 22.
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